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Abstract 
 Poverty is an age long problem that has been part of mankind ever since civilization and the fight against 
poverty is as old.  There are many efforts to fight poverty of which microfinance is one. One theory to explain 
prevalence of poverty especially in the age of capitalism is that poor enterprising people cannot lift themselves 
out of poverty because they lack capital to develop their enterprises. Start up businesses and enterprises 
commonly start operations with credit support from financial institutions but there are prerequisites to attaining 
this credit and numerous poor individuals do not possess these prerequisites. Such individuals are referred to as 
poor and un-bankable. 
 Microfinance therefore tries to act as a market remedy to this problem. Microfinance is the provision of 
financial services to individuals with little or no cash income, small businesses or microenterprises that are 
financially marginalized by the mainstream financial systems.  The notion governing microfinance is that when 
the poor are enabled they can lift themselves out of poverty and therefore it is important to support their 
enterprises irrespective of their creditworthiness.  
 Microfinance involves numerous organizations called Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) and they are 
broadly spread into legal categories like Non-Profit vs. for Profits, Banks, Non Bank Financial Intermediaries, 
Credit Unions etc. They vary as much in organization and clientele focus and are found largely concentrated in 
developing nations of the world but not limited to them. Since its inception microfinance has grown in terms of 
clientele and capital commitment and therefore there is a growing need to understand the state of the industry, 
the organizations in particular, in terms of their sustainability. This research therefore investigates the 
sustainability of MFIs through their governance policies, both internal and external. 
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Introduction 
 Microfinance institutions function as financial institutions but they are not subject to the same market 
forces that tend to enforce due diligence on managers of mainstream financial institutions and therefore the 
question of sustainability is crucial in the microfinance sector. Sustainability of MFIs in general and in this 
research is defined as the ability of the institutions to be financially self sustaining without compromising their 
operations.  MFIs must focus on a double bottom line in terms of performance whereby they are self-sustaining 
in both operations and finances in order to achieve their mission of aiding poverty alleviation. Governance of 
any institution is directly correlated to its performance whereby well governed institutions perform better than 
those that are not and this is not different with MFIs. This research defines governance as deliberate policies 
that affect the operations of MFIs and they are classified into external and internal governance mechanisms. 
 External mechanisms of governance refer to the macro-policies imposed on MFIs to which they have no 
choice but to comply. External mechanisms are usually as a result of government action intended to control 
MFIs and their operations and they include regulation and auditing of financial statements. Internal mechanisms 
of governance refer to micro-policies that individual MFIs choose to adhere to so as to increase their efficiency 
and performance and they include the institution’s board and its characteristics, agent compensation and internal 
financial practices as indicated by MFI internal variables. 
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The managerial dilemma therefore is whether governance of MFIs has an impact on their sustainability so as to 
prescribe appropriate governance policies that will ensure sustainability. In order to better understand its 
dilemma, the research questions below were formulated to provide a framework in which the dilemma could be 
invested: 
 
• Does regulation have an effect on the sustainability of MFIs as measured by Operational Self 
Sufficiency (OSS) and outreach? 
• Does regulation affect different MFIs differently? 
• Does the pursuit of sustainability of MFIs lead to mission drift in its outreach? 
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Literature Review Part A (Theoretical Framework): 
 Both parts A and B of the literature research for this thesis were done through online databases and 
journals like Google Scholar, University of Massachusetts Boston Healey Library text, Journal of Microfinance 
and developmental banks of Africa and Asia. The review is solely based on articles and working papers 
concerned with governance and sustainability of MFIs. 
The literature on sustainability of microfinance through governance is abundant and it consistently 
points out a few mechanisms that seem to affect the above. It’s important to understand the definition of 
sustainability of microfinance because it subjects the interpretation of the impact of the various mechanisms. In 
this research we define sustainability in accordance with the duality of the MFI goals in mind i.e. on one hand 
they strive to attain financial sustainability (Operational Self Sustainability) and on the other to attain a high 
level of outreach to clients that need their services most. Research has shown that often times these goals are in 
contradiction of each other as far as attaining them is concerned through governance policies and therefore 
MFIs continually face a dilemma on which goal to prefer over the other. Depending on the status of the MFI 
this decision dilemma can greatly affect the whole institution’s performance. A review of previous research on 
the governance of MFIs shows a focus on the same mechanisms of governance as summarized below: 
External mechanisms: 
 The level of government involvement in the governance of microfinance institutions is significant and 
banking regulations exist in any country that has a banking sector. This regulation can be justified by market 
failure arising from asymmetric information, market power of institutions and negative externalities and since 
market failure is not limited to the mainstream commercial markets a case can be made for government 
involvement in the microfinance sector through imposing regulation on the institutions involved. Regulation 
therefore is the dominant external mechanism discussed. 
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 Given the importance of regulation in light of possible market failure a regulated MFI is more likely to 
earn customer trust (Mersland, 2007) which should theoretically increase the number of clients served and 
hence improve both financial and outreach performance of the institution and hence attaining a higher level of 
sustainability. However in order for this theory to hold it would mean that there is an observable and consistent 
difference in the number of clients between regulated and non-regulated institutions. The absence of this would 
mean that there is no strong relation between the firms’ official regulation status and the customer trust and 
numbers hence nullifying the theoretical relation between regulation and sustainability. Furthermore, the 
perceived positive impact of regulation on MFIs may be curtailed due the moral hazard problem caused by 
regulation. Regulation of MFIs includes mandates of insurance on depositor funds and therefore this can lead to 
a more aggressive and higher risk taking management style with the insurance in mind as a safety net in the 
event of major losses (O’Hara, 2003). This is important because risk is inherent in the operations of MFIs 
simply because they deal with low net worth and often un-analyzable clients for credit and this controlling the 
risk – lending risk in particular is important so as to achieve sustainability. Lastly, regulation often requires 
standards to be met by the MFIs which include but not limited to technological investment, data security and 
mandatory fees all which can potentially increase the cost of operation of the institutions and thus necessitate 
them to require a higher return on their capital which is manifested through higher interest rates on clients or 
higher disbursed loan minimums. Therefore with the various factors in play regulation is generally considered 
to have no direct impact on the sustainability of MFIs. 
 It’s important to note that much as regulation doesn’t seem to have a direct impact on the sustainability 
of MFIs, it bears an indirect advantage to the same. This is through the marginal activities that regulated MFIs 
can take part in that non-regulated ones cannot. An example of this is the ability to take deposits that many 
countries limit to only regulated institutions in order to ensure safety of clients’ deposits (Cull, 2008). This is 
believed to improve MFI sustainability through operational advantages like increasing its capital base by 
lending out deposits hence reducing the need for leverage and enforcing due diligence on the part of borrowers 
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out of interest to protect their stake in the MFI (Simtowe, 2006) in the case of MFIs that require a client to be a 
depositing member of the institution).  
 Auditing of financial statements by an external third party is considered another external mechanism of 
regulating MFIs. This is because most countries require documentation of the financial operations of MFIs but 
they do not necessarily require this documentation to be a public record. This has created a situation in which 
MFIs keep their financial and often social performance reports as proprietary information and hence hard for 
external possible stakeholders to value their operations. Some of the reviewed literature suggests that MFIs 
stand to gain donor funds, cheaper credit and higher demand for equity (in the case of publically traded MFIs). 
This effect is attributed to the expectation that auditing will reduce the information asymmetry between 
managers of the MFI and interested potential stakeholders who are concerned that in the absence of the due 
diligence market pressures exerted by the mainstream market on mainstream institutions don’t exist in the 
microfinance industry.  Due to this reason many MFIs have their financial statement audited and certified by 
external auditors. Auditing can be an effective external mechanism because it signals to potential investors and 
donors that the manager complied with the accounting practices and did not misrepresent financial information 
(Hartarska, 2007). 
Internal Mechanisms: 
 Internal controls are given a heavy weight of importance because due to the undeveloped microfinance 
sector due to its relative age and the deficiency of market pressure to enforce due diligence on the part of the 
managers. This implies that there has to be a deliberate action(s) to control the actions of managers and as 
earlier stated one way of doing so is externally. However given the broad legal statuses of MFIs the external 
controls may not apply to some institutions and therefore making internal controls not only important but 
necessary. 
 The literature suggests that most important of these is the institution’s board of directors. Just like any 
company whereby managers aren’t necessarily owners of the resources under their control, MFIs face the 
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agency problem (Bassem, 2009). The MFI board should act as a controller of the managers and ensure that the 
policies they undertake are aimed at sustaining the institution and protective of stakeholder objectives. This is 
very important because MFIs face a double bottom line objective and therefore more often than not they have to 
sacrifice one objective for another. Despite the consensus on the importance of the MFI board, the literature 
review revealed different interpretations of components the board structure. For instance, whereas some 
research supported the theory that MFIs with a large board tend to perform better than those that do not 
(Bassem, 2009) the directly contradicting view was expressed by others, that MFIs with a large board have 
worse performance than those that do not (Hartarska, 2007).  
The composition of the MFI is considered crucial because it’s theorized to have an impact on the 
sustainability of the MFI. The articles reviewed revealed a consensus that higher board diversity positively 
affects the performance of the MFI. However there are distinctions made within some articles despite their 
consensus to the above. Hartarska states that whereas board diversity positively affects sustainability, diversity 
between board members has different implications in that a board with more local members improves outreach 
at the expense of OSS while one with more foreign members will improve OSS at the expense of outreach. 
Therefore going by her research findings persuade MFIs to pursue a balanced board in terms of composition so 
as to achieve sustainability. In addition to the above, research suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between the percentages of female board members with sustainability of the institution. 
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Literature Review Part B (Empirical Framework): 
 Whereas the impact of internal mechanisms of MFIs is significant and worth investigating, this research 
doesn’t incorporate it further into this literature review due to absence of data. MFIs operate on a broad 
spectrum and therefore the data that’s publically available varies greatly too but information on the internal 
composition of MFIs is consistently absent due to the MFIs’ attitude towards its release. Many of the MFIs keep 
data pertaining to managers (both demographic and compensation) proprietary and thus there is little to no 
available data on which to base an observational study. Due to the time and financial constraints faced during 
this research it was impossible to attain this kind of data at a meaningful scale and thus the compromise to focus 
on the external mechanisms with selected performance indicators of individual MFIs. 
The major external governance mechanism is regulation which is as a result of government action, 
therefore in order to test the effect of governance policies on the sustainability of MFIs further literature review 
had to be done so as to develop a framework through which the various variables can be tested based on 
existing research models. The aim of this part of the literature review was to familiarize me with the most 
commonly used variables and the methods of analysis so as to aid in the decision of the data and methods 
selected for the research.  Through this I was able to decide on the variables that would be considered in the 
analysis of my research question as discussed below: 
 Outreach at its most basic sense is defined s the number of clients that an MFI serves however I define it 
in this research as the magnitude of the output of a microfinance organization in terms of outreach, percent of 
female borrowers and the target market. This is because I wanted to investigate the research questions without 
neglecting the possibility of mission drift by the MFI. First of all the outreach of the MFI would be important to 
show the participation of the MFI in the sector based on the number of borrowers it supports. In addition to this 
it’s important to keep track of the percentage of women serviced by the MFI because they tend to have a higher 
burden of attaining access to financial services (Navajas, 2000) especially in the developing nations due to age 
old cultural influences. Lastly the target market of the MFI reveals both the depth of the MFI and its focus 
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based on the majority of the borrowers that it services. Looking at these variables together should provide a 
sufficient framework in which we can determine the effect of governance policies on MFIs while controlling for 
mission drift; where mission drift refers to the process through which MFIs continually and gradually sacrifice 
outreach to clients for financial sustainability (Christen, 2000). 
 The activities of MFIs are beneficial to the poor however existing literature suggests that the time frame 
of MFI activities affects the above and therefore making sustainability of the MFIs essential for success 
(Navajas, 2000). Operational Sustainability in this research is defined as the ability of the MFI to cover its 
operating costs with the operating income it attains. Financial sustainability is the ability of MFIs to cover the 
costs of funds at the market price and it is usually used in tandem with the operational sustainability to 
investigate an MFI’s overall OSS. However the literature revealed a high level of dispute on the link between 
financial sustainability and outreach to the poor. Financial self-sufficiency and depth of outreach are not 
inherently dichotomous.  Rather, they have a complex, multidimensional relationship that depends on several 
factors, both direct and indirect.  Moreover, financial self-sufficiency is itself driven by factors that may or may 
not facilitate deep outreach.  The exact relationship between financial self-sufficiency and depth of outreach in a 
given situation will depend on the way in which all these factors interact with each other (Woller, 2002). One 
argument is that in order for MFIs to attain their outreach maximization goal, they will have to incur higher 
transaction costs related to servicing extra clients hence creating an inverse relationship between outreach and 
financial self sufficiency. Another argument is that financial Self sufficiency is affected by variables like the 
number of clients served by the MFI as MFIs that attains economies of scale will reduce its costs hence proving 
more financially sufficient than others that do not have the same advantage. Therefore considering this dispute 
and inadequate time to analyze it, it is ignored as a variable but I highly encourage others that have the 
resources to investigate it further and incorporate it into their analysis to do so because it would be a good 
indicator for prospective stakeholders during MFI evaluation before risking their funds in them. 
 
Daniel Muwamba 
Senior Thesis 2012 
Data and Variables: 
 Microfinance institutions have a focus on a double bottom line in that they aim to attain sustainability 
and positive social performance and therefore two kinds of data are required. Unfortunately microfinance 
institutions have for a long time treated their institution data as proprietary and therefore not publically 
available. This has made it hard to conduct empirical research on their operations. However, this is changing as 
the institutions realize the benefit of publishing data for public use and research as it increases transparency and 
attracts funds to support their operations. The data used in this research is solely sourced from the MIX 
MARKET (http://www.mixmarket.org/) which is an online database that collects MFI information. This is the 
most comprehensive publically available database. The database offers both financial and social performance 
indicators totaling to 83 variables. The data was extracted on a cross country-cross region basis for all the 83 
indicators available from 2000 to 2011. The framework from the empirical framework literature review was 
then applied on the data in order to segregate useful indicators from those that aren’t in respect to this research’s 
questions. The selected indicators were then divided into four categories i.e. Sustainability and Profitability, 
Asset/Liability Management, Portfolio Quality and Efficiency and Productivity based as categorized by the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) training material on Financial Analysis for Microfinance 
Institutions. The indicators were further sub-divided into dependent, independent or control variables. Please 
refer to appendix for the full list of variables and their categorization. 
 The original data selection from MIX returned 11,104 records and therefore there was a need to reduce 
the results so as to allow empirical analysis. The criteria used to trim down the records were as follows; first of 
all the data was controlled by the period of financial data reported. The MIX offered quarterly and annual 
reporting schedules and for this research only MFIs that reported annual data were considered because it was 
based on the majority i.e. majority of MFIs reported annually and this control yielded 10,553 records. 
The outreach of the MFI is measured using offices of the MFI, Number of active borrowers, Average loan 
balance per borrower and Average loan balance per borrower adjusted by GNI per capita as explained below:  
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Offices of the MFI are used because we expect to find their number varying directly with the level of 
outreach of that particular MFI. Given the characteristics of the clientele of MFIs like hindered mobility due to 
transportation costs and concentration in rural areas in their countries, it’s important to have a high degree of 
accessibility so as to provide adequate support to the clientele in addition to the loans provided to them. 
Therefore if the conclusion that regulation has no effect on outreach and sustainability of an MFI as read in the 
literature review, we then expect to see this reflected in the statistical model, and if this is not so then reverse 
result would mean that regulation does have an impact on outreach of MFIs through their ability to deliver 
services and support to clients by utilizing their offices. 
The number of active borrowers is the number of individuals or entities who currently have an 
outstanding balance with the MFI or are primarily responsible for repaying any portion of the loan portfolio 
(Mix Market). In the case of a single borrower holding multiple loans that borrower is counted only once. This 
variable allows the model to test for the impact of regulation on the number of active borrowers that an MFI 
serves. The result will enable us to determine whether there is a negative effect on the outreach of an MFI as a 
result of regulation as the literature suggests happens as a result of MFIs experiencing higher costs of servicing 
a client. Therefore if regulation has a negative impact on the outreach of MFIs then we expect to observe this 
relationship in the statistical model. 
The average loan balance per borrower and average loan balance per borrower adjusted by GNI 
variables are used to measure the effect of regulation on outreach of the MFI. Average loan balance per 
borrower provides a measure of size of the “typical” loan of the MFI hence its clientele while the average loan 
balance per borrower adjusted by GNI segments the clientele into economic class based on the Gross National 
Income of the country in which the MFI operates. This is in an effort to test whether attaining operational self 
sufficiency through regulation actually compels MFIs to mission drift. As earlier explained in the literature 
review, mission drift is when MFIs opt to serve comparatively wealthier clients as opposed to the poorest 
because of the pressure to improve their financial and performance statements. The effect of regulation in this 
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relationship is that it requires such statements to be made public record this accessible to both potential donors 
and creditors to the MFI. In this model we test for the relationship between regulation and outreach for 
regulated and operationally self sufficient MFIs against those that are regulated but not operationally self 
sufficient. 
The sustainability of the MFI in terms of its operations is measured by the calculated Operational Self 
Sufficiency (OSS) ratio of the MFI, Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and Debt to Equity ratio 
(Debt_Equity) as explained below: 
 The OSS ratio of an MFI measures its ability to cover all its operating expenses (including impairment 
loan expenses) with its operating revenue. Therefore, an MFI with a ratio of one or higher is considered to be 
sustainable because it has either enough or more than enough revenue from operations to sustain those 
operations. Such an MFI is considered sustainable because it doesn’t require continuous large external capitals 
to operate. The literature suggests that there is no relation between regulation and OSS and therefore if this is 
true then the model should reveal the same. 
Return of Assets is a measure of profitability based on the assets (both equity and debt) held by the MFI. 
Just like the mainstream financial businesses the return on assets is an important signal on how well managers 
are utilizing the assets at their disposal to generate income. This is therefore an important variable to test 
whether MFIs that are regulated have a better utilization of their assets when regulated as opposed to not being 
regulated. The rationale behind the above reasoning is that since microfinance as an industry doesn’t have 
strong market forces to compel managers to perform at their utmost best and they may therefore become 
inefficient in utilizing the MFIs assets in earning income. Therefore if regulation requires publicizing their 
financial and performance statements then it acts as the exogenous factor that motivates them to manage the 
assets prudently hence attaining OSS in the long run. Therefore if regulation has impact on the ROA of the MFI 
then it has an impact on the OSS of the institution. 
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Return on Equity is a measure of profitability based on the shareholder equity of the MFI. Traditionally, 
MFIs have operated on a strict capitalization mix of debt and donations for various reasons but this is changing 
as more of them continue to attract equity and in the case of Latin America rapidly become publically traded 
companies. Whereas ROA demonstrates the level of profitability of the MFI, it doesn’t give a comparable base 
due to the wide variance between asset bases of the different MFIs. Therefore in order to be able to compare 
this profitability we shall rely on the ROE. The literature review suggests that the MFI stands to benefit from 
equity because it will reduce its cost of capital hence reducing its cost of loans and thereby attracting more 
borrowers and attaining OSS in the long run. However, potential shareholders only invest when they believe 
there is a return to be earned and therefore regulatory requirements to have audited financial statements are 
expected to enhance the MFI’s financial profile and thereby attracting more equity. Therefore the expectation is 
that regulated MFIs will have higher equity which enables higher earnings and therefore higher ROE 
Debt to equity is a measure of liability management and is used to measure what amount of debt and 
equity is used to finance assets. As earlier mentioned, the MFI is evolving from heavy debt capitalization 
towards a mix of debt and equity. The measure of sustainability by ROA returns the utilization of the assets 
irrespective of the liability funding them and given the consideration of an ROE impact on the ROA, it’s only 
prudent to consider the effect of debt through the debt to equity. The literature suggests that regulation enables 
MFIs attract more equity capital which in the long run leads to OSS so this implies that regulation reduces the 
debt to equity ratio of MFIs and this should be observed in the statistical model.  
(Please see appendix for summary statistics and correlation coefficients of the model variables) 
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Methodology: 
 This research bases on selected literature concerning the sustainability of MFIs through governance and 
therefore its inquiry is based on questions that arose from the literature review was opposed to formulated 
hypotheses. Therefore observational statistics was utilized to  determine the relationship between regulation and 
the chosen variables and the significance levels. Three independent models are utilized to test the above 
relationship and they are as follows: 
 The first model is to test the relationship and significance of regulation on the outreach and 
sustainability of the MFIs measured by the variables as explained in the data and variables section of this paper. 
The model holds the variables regulated, assets and deposits as independent and compares them their 
relationship to dependent outreach variables (offices, number of active borrowers) and sustainability variables 
(OSS, ROA, ROE, Debt_Equity). The variable regulated in this model is dichotomous where regulated is 1 and 
non-regulated is 0 and all other variables are continuous. Given the variation of MFIs as a result of their regions 
of operations (continents and countries) this model is run for all individual regions, with the variables kept as is 
so as to investigate the results categorized by region. The significance test is done by simple linear regression 
for each of the dependent variables. 
The second model is an exploratory model designed to investigate the relationship between regulated 
MFIs only and the dependent variables as listed above. This model is meant to explore the results of model one 
categorized by the current legal status of the MFI. It’s important to have this model because MFIs vary greatly 
from each other in terms of their operations based on the legal status they identify with. Therefore this model is 
meant to investigate the impact of MFI’s legal status on the relationship of regulation and the dependent 
variables from model one. In addition to the dependent variables from model one, two variables Cost per 
borrower and Cost per loan are added to investigate the effect of regulation across legal statuses. The variable 
regulated is dichotomous as like in model one, variable current legal status is categorical and all other variables 
are continuous. The significance test is done by compared means and one-way ANOVAs. 
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The third model is designed to investigate the relationship between regulation, operational self 
sufficiency and mission drift in the MFI’s outreach. The independent variables are regulated and OSS as 
measured by sustainability. Sustainability is when the MFI achieves an OSS ratio greater than or equal to 1 
(OSS) and an MFI with an OSS ratio less than 1 is not (Non-OSS). Therefore in this model the variable 
regulated is equal to 1 and sustainability is dichotomous such that OSS is equal to 1 and Non-OSS is equal to 0. 
Mission drift in outreach is measured by the average loan balance per borrower and the target market of the 
MFI is measured by the average loan balance per borrower adjusted by GNI. The significance is tested by 
compared means and one way ANOVAs. 
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Results: 
Model 1 – Full Model 
Variable Offices Num_Act_Borrowers OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity 
Regulated -.005 -.075*** -.004 .037*** .015 .017 
 (.1.561) (7633.267) (.019) (.003) (.368) (2.026) 
Assets .778*** 1.174*** .015 .059 .002 -.013 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Deposits -.393*** -.716*** -.009 -.037 -.001 .012 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
 
Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%  
 
 
The overall model testing the relationship between regulation, assets and deposits of the MFI and its 
outreach as measured by the number of offices is significant. However, regulation is not significant as a variable 
to explain the model as shown above. The model is explained by assets in that the more assets an MFI has then 
the higher its outreach is. Since regulation is not significant we agree with the literature that regulation has no 
relation to the outreach of MFIs as measured by the number of offices in general.  
The overall model testing the relationship between regulation, assets and deposits of the MFI and its 
outreach as measured by the number of active borrowers is significant. Regulation which is the primary 
independent variable of interest is significant as shown by the model results above. Regulated has a negative 
standardized coefficient at the 1% significance level and therefore this means that regulated MFIs tend to have a 
lower number of active borrowers as compared to non-regulated ones. This is in line with the literature review 
which states that regulating MFIs may in fact increase their costs per borrower and therefore leading to fewer 
loans created and lower number of active borrowers. 
The overall model testing the relationship between regulation, assets and deposits of the MFI and its 
internal sustainability as measured by its ROA is significant. Regulation which is the primary independent 
variable of interest is also significant as shown by the model results above. Regulated has a positive 
standardized coefficient at the 1% significance level and therefore this means that regulated MFIs tend to have a 
Daniel Muwamba 
Senior Thesis 2012 
higher ROA as regulation will increase ROA. Given that the literature links ROA to sustainability this result 
suggests that regulation will increase the operational self sufficiency of the MFI. 
The overall models testing the relationship between regulation, assets and deposits of MFIs and OSS, 
ROE and Debt to Equity are not significant. 
Model 1 - Africa 
Variable Offices Num_Act_Borrowers OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity 
Regulated .252** -.024 -.149 -.250** -.126 -.193 
 (1.862) (2155.837) (.116) (.057) (.107) (.625) 
Assets .091 .391*** .105 .228** -.105 .039 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Deposits .003 -.049 .028 n/a n/a      -.055 
 (.010) (11.090) (.000) n/a n/a (.002) 
 
Model 1 – East Asia and Pacific 
Variable Offices Num_Act_Borrowers OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity 
Regulated -.085*** -.020*** .100*** .096*** .049 .146*** 
 (3.898) (8145.251) (.051) (.008) (.042) (.608) 
Assets .748*** 1.158*** -.067 -.039 -.035 -.036 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Deposits -.048 -.282*** -.014 .012 .019 .044 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 – Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
Variable Offices Num_Act_Borrowers OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity 
Regulated -.032 .065*** -.018 .060* .045 .026 
 (1.318) (826.213) (.046) (.009) (.050) (.407) 
Assets .627*** .725*** -.103*** -.081** -.014 .131*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Deposits .007 -.006 .023 .046 .005 -.021 
 (.022) (13.810) (.001) (.000) (.002) (.007) 
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Model 1 – Latin America and the Caribbean 
Variable Offices Num_Act_Borrowers OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity 
Regulated .045*** -.028** .032 .061*** .066*** .018 
 (1.164) (3316.124) (.020) (.008) (.071) (1.386) 
Assets 1.911*** 2.278*** .238*** .254*** .089 -.027 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Deposits -1.254*** -1.674*** -.234*** -.243*** -.084 .047 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
 
Model 1 – Middle East and North Africa 
Variable Offices Num_Act_Borrowers OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity 
Regulated -.113*** -.064** -.076 -.165** .028 -.071 
 (7.434) (5581.064) (.404) (.011) (.627) (1.589) 
Assets .833*** .875*** -.023 -.070 .023 .042 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Deposits n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
Model 1 – South Asia 
Variable Offices Num_Act_Borrowers OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity 
Regulated -.114*** -.064*** .003 .050 -.061 .050 
 (13.682) (19178.248) (.025) (.008) (.268) (12.369) 
Assets 1.005*** 1.035*** .258*** .172*** -.012 -.035 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Deposits -.184*** -.128*** -.145*** -.079 -.005 .025 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
 
FOR ALL MODELS ABOVE 
 
Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10% 
n/a: Variable deleted as it bears direct relation to the dependent variable or the dependent variable is constant 
 Model 1 is evaluated for all the different regions so that we can investigate the particular contribution of 
each region to the full model and variation is expected because of the variation of the countries in which the 
MFIs operate as shown above.  
 From the results above, it’s easy to observe the different relationships of the same variables. Compared 
to the overall model in which regulated was not significant, it is significant and positively affects the outreach 
of the MFI as measured by the number of offices in African and Latin America and the Caribbean while it is 
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significant but affects outreach measured by the number of offices of the MFI negatively. Only the region of 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia conforms to the overall model results by having a non significant result of 
regulation on the outreach of the MFI. 
 The overall model shows the relationship between regulation and the outreach of the MFIs as measured 
by the number of active borrowers as significant and regulated MFIs register a lower number of active 
borrowers. This is in line with the regional models of East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa and South Asia. Only Eastern Europe and Central Asia demonstrates a 
significant relationship of regulation to outreach as measured by the number of o active borrowers that is 
positive. Africa as a region demonstrates a model that’s not statistically significant. 
 The overall model shows the relationship between regulation and the sustainability of the MFIs as 
measured by the operational self sufficiency ratio as not statistically significant and therefore in line with the 
literature review. The regional models of Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa and South Asia are in line with the results of the overall model i.e. 
there is no significant relationship. East Asia and the pacific is the only region that showed a statistically 
significant relationship between regulation and OSS of the MFI and the relationship is a positive one. 
 The overall model shows the relationship between regulation and sustainability as measured by the ROA 
as significant and its positive meaning that regulated MFIs are observed to have a higher ROA. The regional 
analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean 
shows a similar relationship as the overall model. However, regions Africa and Middle East and North Africa 
show a significant relationship between regulation and OSS as measured by the ROA but with a negative 
relation. South Asia is the only region in which there is no statistical significance between the above variables. 
 The overall model shows the relationship between regulation and sustainability as measured by the ROE 
as non significant and therefore implying that there is no relation between regulation and a higher ROE and 
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eventual sustainability in the long run. All regional analyses conform to this result with the exception of Latin 
America and the Caribbean where the relationship is both significant and positive.  
 The overall model shows the relationship between regulation and sustainability as measured by the debt 
to equity as not statistically significant. However, the regional analyses of East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean show regulation as statistically significant 
relationship and its positive implying that in these regions sustainability is positively affected by regulation. 
Model 2 (see appendix for detailed data tables) 
Select Variables of Regulated MFIs with Statistically Significant Mean Differences 
Variable Bank Credit Union/Cooperative NBFI NGO Rural Bank 
Cost_borrower Higher Lower Higher Lower Lower 
Num_Act_Borrowers Higher n/a n/a Lower Lower 
Offices Higher n/a n/a Lower Lower 
OSS Higher n/a n/a Lower Higher 
ROA n/a n/a n/a Lower Higher 
n/a: Model doesn’t achieve statistical mean difference 
 Given the observed differences of the relationship between regulation and the outreach and 
sustainability of MFIs across different region, an exploratory test is necessary to investigate whether the impact 
of regulation leads to different results on MFIs based on their legal status. Just as MFIs are geographically 
diverse they are very diverse in the legal status which determines their operations. The literature review 
suggests that regulation can lead to higher costs for the MFI and therefore hamper its outreach and sustainability 
and therefore specific dependent variables have been chosen to investigate such possible results. The costs 
incurred by regulated MFIs will be captured in the cost per borrower as this variable includes the operating 
expenses of the MFI and therefore is chosen to track the same costs. In all models of the MFI current legal 
statuses the mean difference between regulated and non-regulated MFIs is statistically significant. Other 
variables significant within the legal status of the MFI are also considered to explain differences between 
regulated and non-regulated within the category but not between across categories.  
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 Across categories only Banks and Non Bank Financial Intermediaries exhibit a higher cost per borrower 
when regulated than when not. All other categories have the non-regulated MFIs with a higher cost per 
borrower. Assuming that the regulatory costs are significant contributors to this variable then this provides a 
foundation upon which we can dispute the impact of regulatory costs on the cost of the MFI and eventually the 
cost per borrower. On the other hand, Banks exhibited higher outreach as measured by the number of active 
borrowers and by offices in addition to exhibiting higher sustainability as measured by the OSS when regulated 
as opposed to not being regulated implying that regulation has no negative impact on MFIs operating as Banks. 
Rural Banks however are observed to achieve higher OSS when regulated as opposed to not being regulated but 
at the same time they exhibit lower outreach as measured by number of active borrowers and by number of 
offices thus implying that regulation of Rural Banks increases their sustainability at the expense of outreach. 
NGOs exhibit lower measures of both sustainability and outreach when regulated as opposed to being regulated. 
They exhibit lower values for all variables in the model. The models for Credit Unions and NBFIs provide 
insight only to the cost per borrower and they exhibit higher values for this variable. All other values do not 
achieve statistically different means. 
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Model 3 
Case Processing Summary for Mission Drift 
 Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Av_Loan_Bal_Borrower  * 
Sustainability 
5081 84.8% 909 15.2% 5990 100.0% 
Av_Loan_Bal_Borrower_GNI  * 
Sustainability 
5084 84.9% 906 15.1% 5990 100.0% 
Num_Act_Borrowers  * 
Sustainability 
5099 85.1% 891 14.9% 5990 100.0% 
Report on Means of Variables by Category of Sustainability 
Sustainability Av_Loan_Bal_Borrower Av_Loan_Bal_Borrower_GN
I 
Num_Act_Borrowers 
0 
Mean 1030.03 .94 51703.44 
N 1412 1413 1419 
Std. Deviation 2219.894 2.081 440426.387 
1 
Mean 1508.81 1.17 57526.95 
N 3669 3671 3680 
Std. Deviation 4406.698 3.649 256709.857 
Total 
Mean 1375.76 1.10 55906.32 
N 5081 5084 5099 
Std. Deviation 3928.893 3.290 318618.588 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Av_Loan_Bal_Borrower 
Between Groups 233726578.960 1 233726578.960 15.184 .000 
Within Groups 78182164300.371 5079 15393219.984 
  
Total 78415890879.332 5080 
   
Av_Loan_Bal_Borrower_GNI 
Between Groups 54.966 1 54.966 5.081 .024 
Within Groups 54977.835 5082 10.818 
  
Total 55032.800 5083 
   
Num_Act_Borrowers 
Between Groups 34730724760.500 1 34730724760.500 .342 .559 
Within Groups 
517503038033286.7
50 
5097 101530907991.620 
  
Total 
517537768758047.2
50 
5098 
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As shown in model 2 regulation has different effects on different MFIs as categorized by their legal 
statuses and with the exception of Banks all other significant results show that regulation has a negative impact 
on the MFI’s outreach and simultaneously improving the sustainability of the MFI as measured by OSS. 
Therefore, the question of mission drift arises in that given the inverse impact of regulation on outreach and 
OSS a trade off exists and thus creating a need to sacrifice one for the other. In this model we attempt to 
investigate whether institutions that are regulated and have achieved operational self sufficiency significantly 
exhibit lower outreach as measured by the average loan balance per borrower and the average loan balance per 
borrower adjusted by GNI. These two variables will indicate the level of poverty of the MFIs’ clientele and the 
targeted segment of the MFI respectively. 
 As the model results shown above indicate, there is a significant difference in the means of the variables 
across regulated MFIs that are either sustainable (1) or non-sustainable (0). Sustainable MFIs show a 
characteristic of both higher average loan balance per borrower and the average loan balance per borrower 
adjusted for GNI thus demonstrating mission drift. 
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Conclusions 
 Model 1 shows that regulation has no relation to the outreach and sustainability of the MFI as measured 
by number of offices and OSS, ROE and Debt to Equity respectively. However regulation will negatively affect 
the number of active borrowers that an MFI services and therefore there is no expectation for increased social 
performance of the MFI as a result of regulation. On the other hand, regulation has a significant and positive 
relation on the ROA of the MFI but no significant relation with the ROE and Debt to Equity. This implies that 
the source of funding for the assets isn’t directly affected by the regulatory status of the MFI and therefore MFIs 
should be able to attain sustainability through prudent management without regulation. This follows from the 
literature review that states manager performance (in this case measured by ROA) varying directly with the 
level of financial transparency of the MFI which regulation enforces. MFIs therefore can be unregulated and 
financially transparent and achieve operational sustainability without sacrificing their outreach. 
 The regional tests based on model 1 show that only African and Latin America and the Caribbean MFIs 
improve their outreach as measured by the number of offices that the MFI operates when regulated and 
therefore they are the only regions in which regulation may be suitable to increase outreach. However given the 
negative effect of regulation on the number of active borrowers in these regions, this divergence from the 
overall model could be explained by the specific regulatory procedures in these regions. For example, 
regulation in Africa mainly focuses on a tier system whereby different regulatory policies are exerted on 
different MFIs based on criteria like legal status and size. Therefore the increase in outreach coupled with the 
reduction in the number of active borrowers could be an effect of improper classification of the level of 
regulation of the source data in the MIX market database given that regulated is a dichotomous variable 
(Yes/No). 
 Model 2 shows that there is a different impact of regulation on OSS and outreach of MFIs based on their 
legal statuses and therefore its impact will largely depend on the dominant legal status among the MFIs. Since 
only Banks and NBFI exhibit costs per borrower when regulated this means that their structure of business 
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affects the impact of regulation. Banks and NBFI are typically not limited to microfinance and therefore tend to 
be larger in both assets base and staff numbers. Since regulation requires internal checks and balances of the 
MFI, the magnitude of these institutions leads to their higher costs per borrower. NGO performance is hindered 
by regulation in all variables observed and this can be attributed to the profile of the institutions. The majority 
of NGOs operating in microfinance are foreign as evidenced by the increasing amount of cross-border funding 
from developed to developing nations and thus such institutions tend to have a governing structure that’s linear 
across all markets of operation. Since regulation is an external control enforced by governments, there is 
divergence between the regulatory demands and the NGO operational strategy hence the consistently lower 
results when regulated. Rural Banks are predominantly operated either by the government or as parasatal 
organizations (due to their focus on rural agriculture that is the backbone of most developing nations’ 
economies) and thereby making external supervision important. Generally speaking governments in developing 
nations face rampant corruption and therefore programs like microfinance often fall victim to financial 
mismanagement and this is catalyzed if the MFI has no obligation to report its financial statements to the public. 
In addition, mismanagement is rampant in these countries which can lead to poor utilization of resources 
available to the MFI. Therefore with regulation in place to scrutinize these activities we expect lower costs per 
borrower and higher OSS and ROA as shown by the model. 
 Model 3 shows that regulated MFIs that achieve OSS tend to have a clientele that holds large average 
loan balances which can be an indication that they are serving relatively wealthier individuals as opposed to the 
poorest of the poor. The high transaction cost of maintaining loans of small amounts is one reason as to why the 
poor cannot borrow from the mainstream financial institutions as such institutions try to minimize transaction 
costs. MFIs can follow the same practice if the focus heavily on achieving OSS at the expense of the clientele 
served. It’s important to note that the model shows an insignificant difference between the means of the number 
of active borrowers between regulated and operationally self sufficient institutions and those that aren’t. This is 
as a result of the MFI exhibiting mission drift based on the clientele economic group as opposed to the number 
of clients served because reducing the latter would work against its objective to achieve sustainability. 
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Therefore MFIs that experience mission drift will have almost as many number of active borrowers as the rest 
but in a comparably better off target market of clients that can afford to hold larger loan balances which would 
reduce the MFI’s transactional costs per loan against a steady volume of loans hence increasing its financial 
performance and OSS. This is strong evidence of mission drift. 
Limitations: 
 I believe that this paper does a lot in investigating the effects of regulation on the outreach and 
sustainability of MFIs but there is more that can be done to make it better than what it has to offer presently. 
The first limitation is that due to lack of access to the internal mechanisms of MFI control, this paper largely 
focuses on regulation and therefore misses out on the impact of the former. MFIs continue to keep a lot of the 
internal characteristics data proprietary and therefore future research should be planned with adequate time and 
financial resources to gain access to such data. The second limitation of this paper is that the data used for 
analysis is solely sourced from the MIX market database and therefore there are no continuous exogenous 
variables that can segregate results based on the variations of the macroeconomic conditions of the countries or 
regions in which MFIs operate. Just as the regional analysis yielded different results from the overall model in 
the first model, exogenous macroeconomic conditions could probably have a significant effect on the results. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniel Muwamba 
Senior Thesis 2012 
Abbreviations: 
• MFIs - Microfinance Institutions 
• NBFI - Non Bank Financial Intermediary 
• NGO - Non Government Organization 
• OSS - Operational Self Sufficiency 
• ROA - Return on Assets 
• ROE - Return on Equity 
Helpful links 
• MIX Market: http://www.mixmarket.org/ 
• MIX Market Glossary: http://www.mixmarket.org/about/faqs/glossary 
• MIX Market Frequently Asked Questions concerning variables and calculations of ratios: 
http://www.mixmarket.org/about/faqs#calculations 
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Appendix: 
List of Countries in which MFI Data Was Extracted By Region 
# Africa East Asia and the Pacific 
Eastern 
Europe and 
Central 
Asia 
Latin America and The 
Caribbean 
Middle 
East and 
North 
Africa South Asia 
1 Angola Cambodia Albania Argentina Egypt Afghanistan 
2 Benin China, People's Republic of Armenia Belize Iraq Bangladesh 
3 Burkina Faso East Timor Azerbaijan Bolivia Jordan Bhutan 
4 Burundi Fiji 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Brazil Lebanon India 
5 Cameroon Indonesia Bulgaria Chile Morocco Nepal 
6 Central African Republic Laos Croatia Colombia Palestine Pakistan 
7 Chad Malaysia Georgia Costa Rica Sudan Sri Lanka 
8 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the Papua New Guinea Hungary Dominican Republic Syria   
9 Congo, Republic of the Philippines Kazakhstan Ecuador Tunisia   
10 Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) Samoa Kosovo El Salvador Yemen   
11 Ethiopia Thailand Kyrgyzstan Grenada     
12 Gabon Tonga Macedonia Guatemala     
13 Gambia, The Vanuatu Moldova Haiti     
14 Ghana Vietnam Mongolia Honduras     
15 Guinea   Montenegro Jamaica     
16 Guinea-Bissau   Poland Mexico     
17 Kenya   Romania Nicaragua     
18 Liberia   Russia Panama     
19 Madagascar   Serbia Paraguay     
20 Malawi   Slovakia Peru     
21 Mali   Tajikistan Saint Lucia     
22 Mozambique   Turkey Suriname     
23 Namibia   Ukraine Trinidad and Tobago     
24 Niger   Uzbekistan Uruguay     
25 Nigeria     Venezuela     
26 Rwanda           
27 Senegal           
28 Sierra Leone           
29 South Africa           
30 South Sudan           
31 Swaziland           
32 Tanzania           
33 Togo           
34 Uganda           
35 Zambia           
36 Zimbabwe           
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Summary Statistics 
 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Assets 10216 .00 4732197926.00 32864549.8202 152244332.77144 
Av_Loan_Bal_Borrower 9763 0 171473 1193.38 3537.595 
Av_Loan_Bal_Borrower_GNI 9719 0 113 .80 2.535 
Cost_per_Borrower 7613 0 179116 245.29 2666.668 
Cost_per_Loan 4412 0 997 164.89 162.620 
Debt_Equity 9860 -3567 21050 7.89 229.953 
Deposits 7116 .00 8472837222.00 24247624.8897 206430203.21364 
Num_Act_Borrowers 9833 .00 8340623.00 56716.1371 358571.16563 
Offices 6333 0 994 28.96 67.250 
OSS 9634 -1 81 1.17 1.147 
Regulated 10418 0 1 .57 .494 
ROA 8060 -113 1 -.02 1.350 
ROE 8057 -1059 169 -.18 15.415 
Sustainability 9461 0 1 .71 .456 
Valid N (listwise) 4216 
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Assets Pearson 
Correlation 
1               
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
                
N 10216               
Av_Loan_Bal_Borrower Pearson 
Correlation 
.090** 1             
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000               
N 9579 9763             
Av_Loan_Bal_Borrower_GNI Pearson 
Correlation 
.025* .465** 1           
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.013 0.000             
N 9540 9713 9719           
Cost_per_Borrower Pearson 
Correlation 
.004 .105** .067** 1         
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.705 .000 .000           
N 7605 7604 7560 7613         
Cost_per_Loan Pearson 
Correlation 
.080** .632** .456** .925** 1       
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 0.000 .000 0.000         
N 4407 4407 4369 4407 4412       
Debt_Equity Pearson 
Correlation 
-.002 -.003 -.003 .001 -.006 1     
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.857 .771 .751 .918 .690       
N 9858 9298 9259 7595 4406 9860     
Deposits Pearson 
Correlation 
.861** .080** .052** .004 .115** .003 1   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.000 .000 .000 .745 .000 .832     
N 6995 6679 6634 5704 4386 6833 7116   
Num_Act_Borrowers Pearson 
Correlation 
.554** -
.031** 
-.028** -.011 -
.119** 
-
.002 
.333** 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
0.000 .003 .005 .339 .000 .851 .000   
N 9634 9763 9719 7609 4409 9329 6721 9833 
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Offices Pearson 
Correlation 
.438** -.056** -.035** -.020 -.143** .002 .280** .614** 1           
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .006 .146 .000 .886 .000 0.000             
N 6217 6265 6219 5493 4338 619
0 
6238 6286 6333           
OSS Pearson 
Correlation 
.003 .025* .017 .021 -.044** -
.003 
.003 .006 .002 1         
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.789 .016 .102 .062 .004 .745 .803 .552 .863           
N 9622 9134 9096 7604 4410 960
7 
6741 9165 6169 963
4 
        
Regulated Pearson 
Correlation 
.116** .074** .142** .055** .129** -
.010 
.087** -.002 .057** -
.008 
1       
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .332 .000 .810 .000 .415         
N 10098 9667 9624 7575 4407 976
9 
7009 9734 6279 954
2 
10418       
ROA Pearson 
Correlation 
.007 .007 .007 -.933** -.096** .000 .005 .005 .011 .007 .037** 1     
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.554 .517 .550 0.000 .000 .986 .725 .646 .395 .529 .001       
N 8060 7824 7783 7463 4397 804
8 
6079 7841 5757 805
5 
8002 8060     
ROE Pearson 
Correlation 
.005 .006 .006 -.603** .001 -
.029
** 
.004 .003 .007 -
.001 
.013 .556** 1   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.663 .592 .618 0.000 .933 .010 .733 .771 .571 .933 .239 0.000     
N 8057 7820 7779 7454 4399 805
2 
6084 7837 5761 805
2 
8000 8040 80
57 
  
Sustainability Pearson 
Correlation 
.068** .060** .033** -.046** -.070** -
.011 
.058** .037** .035** .288
** 
.033** .540** .03
4** 
1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .292 .000 .000 .007 .000 .002 0.000 .00
3 
  
N 9441 8986 8990 7469 4326 942
3 
6565 9015 6039 944
5 
9386 7898 78
94 
9461 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Model 2 
Case Processing Summary 
  
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Cost_Borrower  * Bank 4271 71.3% 1719 28.7% 5990 100.0% 
Cost_Loan  * Bank 2450 40.9% 3540 59.1% 5990 100.0% 
Num_Act_Borrowers  * Bank 5512 92.0% 478 8.0% 5990 100.0% 
Offices  * Bank 3539 59.1% 2451 40.9% 5990 100.0% 
OSS  * Bank 5450 91.0% 540 9.0% 5990 100.0% 
ROA  * Bank 4564 76.2% 1426 23.8% 5990 100.0% 
ROE  * Bank 4562 76.2% 1428 23.8% 5990 100.0% 
Debt_Equity  * Bank 5562 92.9% 428 7.1% 5990 100.0% 
Cost_Borrower  * 
Credit_Union_Cooperative 
4271 71.3% 1719 28.7% 5990 100.0% 
Cost_Loan  * Credit_Union_Cooperative 2450 40.9% 3540 59.1% 5990 100.0% 
Num_Act_Borrowers  * 
Credit_Union_Cooperative 
5512 92.0% 478 8.0% 5990 100.0% 
Offices  * Credit_Union_Cooperative 3539 59.1% 2451 40.9% 5990 100.0% 
OSS  * Credit_Union_Cooperative 5450 91.0% 540 9.0% 5990 100.0% 
 
  
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
ROA  * Credit_Union_Cooperative 4564 76.2% 1426 23.8% 5990 100.0% 
ROE  * Credit_Union_Cooperative 4562 76.2% 1428 23.8% 5990 100.0% 
Debt_Equity  * 
Credit_Union_Cooperative 
5562 92.9% 428 7.1% 5990 100.0% 
Cost_Borrower  * NBFI 4271 71.3% 1719 28.7% 5990 100.0% 
Cost_Loan  * NBFI 2450 40.9% 3540 59.1% 5990 100.0% 
Num_Act_Borrowers  * NBFI 5512 92.0% 478 8.0% 5990 100.0% 
Offices  * NBFI 3539 59.1% 2451 40.9% 5990 100.0% 
OSS  * NBFI 5450 91.0% 540 9.0% 5990 100.0% 
ROA  * NBFI 4564 76.2% 1426 23.8% 5990 100.0% 
ROE  * NBFI 4562 76.2% 1428 23.8% 5990 100.0% 
Debt_Equity  * NBFI 5562 92.9% 428 7.1% 5990 100.0% 
Cost_Borrower  * NGO 4271 71.3% 1719 28.7% 5990 100.0% 
Cost_Loan  * NGO 2450 40.9% 3540 59.1% 5990 100.0% 
Num_Act_Borrowers  * NGO 5512 92.0% 478 8.0% 5990 100.0% 
Offices  * NGO 3539 59.1% 2451 40.9% 5990 100.0% 
OSS  * NGO 5450 91.0% 540 9.0% 5990 100.0% 
ROA  * NGO 4564 76.2% 1426 23.8% 5990 100.0% 
ROE  * NGO 4562 76.2% 1428 23.8% 5990 100.0% 
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Continued 
Case Processing Summary 
  
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Debt_Equity  * NGO 5562 92.9% 428 7.1% 5990 100.0% 
Cost_Borrower  * Rural_Bank 4271 71.3% 1719 28.7% 5990 100.0% 
Cost_Loan  * Rural_Bank 2450 40.9% 3540 59.1% 5990 100.0% 
Num_Act_Borrowers  * Rural_Bank 5512 92.0% 478 8.0% 5990 100.0% 
Offices  * Rural_Bank 3539 59.1% 2451 40.9% 5990 100.0% 
OSS  * Rural_Bank 5450 91.0% 540 9.0% 5990 100.0% 
ROA  * Rural_Bank 4564 76.2% 1426 23.8% 5990 100.0% 
ROE  * Rural_Bank 4562 76.2% 1428 23.8% 5990 100.0% 
Debt_Equity  * Rural_Bank 5562 92.9% 428 7.1% 5990 100.0% 
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Table 1: Cost_Borrower Cost_Loan Num_Act_Borrowers Offices OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity  * Bank 
Bank Cost_Borrower Cost_Loan Num_Act_Borrowe
rs 
Offices OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity 
.00 
Mean 200.17 164.45 40648.6462 27.63 1.1716 .01 .10 6.3428 
N 3642 2073 4729 2986 4686 3892 3892 4796 
Std. Deviation 520.235 155.943 211302.37067 60.024 .73285 .124 1.928 98.66392 
1.00 
Mean 379.97 290.15 153696.7190 59.49 1.1059 .01 .15 3.4907 
N 629 377 783 553 764 672 670 766 
Std. Deviation 468.109 218.302 654942.29717 96.989 .31911 .081 1.125 48.42935 
Total 
Mean 226.65 183.79 56707.5434 32.61 1.1624 .01 .11 5.9500 
N 4271 2450 5512 3539 5450 4564 4562 5562 
Std. Deviation 516.783 173.059 317379.77899 68.127 .69032 .119 1.832 93.36644 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Cost_Borrower 
Between Groups 17339798.572 1 17339798.572 65.914 .000 
Within Groups 1123025778.574 4269 263065.303 
  
Total 1140365577.146 4270 
   
Cost_Loan 
Between Groups 5040220.518 1 5040220.518 180.635 .000 
Within Groups 68305975.564 2448 27902.768 
  
Total 73346196.082 2449 
   
Num_Act_Borrowers 
Between Groups 8585156044150.313 1 8585156044150.313 86.553 .000 
Within Groups 
546537455736593.50
0 
5510 99190100859.636 
  
Total 
555122611780743.80
0 
5511 
   
Offices 
Between Groups 473551.217 1 473551.217 105.031 .000 
Within Groups 15947135.266 3537 4508.661 
  
Total 16420686.483 3538 
   
OSS 
Between Groups 2.838 1 2.838 5.960 .015 
Within Groups 2593.850 5448 .476 
  
Total 2596.687 5449 
   
ROA 
Between Groups .036 1 .036 2.530 .112 
Within Groups 64.491 4562 .014 
  
Total 64.527 4563 
   
ROE 
Between Groups 1.333 1 1.333 .397 .529 
Within Groups 15304.996 4560 3.356 
  
Total 15306.328 4561 
   
Debt_Equity 
Between Groups 5372.705 1 5372.705 .616 .432 
Within Groups 48471492.625 5560 8717.894 
  
Total 48476865.330 5561 
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Table 2: Cost_Borrower Cost_Loan Num_Act_Borrowers Offices OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity  * Credit_Union_Cooperative 
Credit_Union_Cooperative Cost_Borrower Cost_Loan Num_Act_Borrow
ers 
Offices OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity 
.00 
Mean 233.03 178.36 66479.4828 32.88 1.1605 .01 .10 6.4748 
N 3492 2127 4466 3022 4381 3707 3700 4464 
Std. Deviation 561.689 173.990 350751.66661 69.377 .68292 .124 1.398 88.27536 
1.00 
Mean 198.05 219.54 14985.2859 31.02 1.1704 .01 .14 3.8161 
N 779 323 1046 517 1069 857 862 1098 
Std. Deviation 221.574 162.582 58374.89798 60.339 .72015 .095 3.063 111.72198 
Total 
Mean 226.65 183.79 56707.5434 32.61 1.1624 .01 .11 5.9500 
N 4271 2450 5512 3539 5450 4564 4562 5562 
Std. Deviation 516.783 173.059 317379.77899 68.127 .69032 .119 1.832 93.36644 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Cost_Borrower 
Between Groups 779662.166 1 779662.166 2.921 .088 
Within Groups 1139585914.980 4269 266944.464 
  
Total 1140365577.146 4270 
   
Cost_Loan 
Between Groups 475551.636 1 475551.636 15.976 .000 
Within Groups 72870644.446 2448 29767.420 
  
Total 73346196.082 2449 
   
Num_Act_Borrowers 
Between Groups 2247283034214.935 1 2247283034214.935 22.397 .000 
Within Groups 
552875328746530.0
60 
5510 100340350044.742 
  
Total 
555122611780745.0
00 
5511 
   
Offices 
Between Groups 1529.209 1 1529.209 .329 .566 
Within Groups 16419157.274 3537 4642.114 
  
Total 16420686.483 3538 
   
OSS 
Between Groups .086 1 .086 .180 .671 
Within Groups 2596.602 5448 .477 
  
Total 2596.687 5449 
   
ROA 
Between Groups .019 1 .019 1.327 .249 
Within Groups 64.508 4562 .014 
  
Total 64.527 4563 
   
ROE 
Between Groups 1.214 1 1.214 .362 .548 
Within Groups 15305.115 4560 3.356 
  
Total 15306.328 4561 
   
Debt_Equity 
Between Groups 6229.453 1 6229.453 .715 .398 
Within Groups 48470635.877 5560 8717.740 
  
Total 48476865.330 5561 
   
 
Daniel Muwamba 
Senior Thesis 2012 
Table 3: Cost_Borrower Cost_Loan Num_Act_Borrowers Offices OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity  * NBFI 
NBFI Cost_Borrower Cost_Loan Num_Act_Borrowe
rs 
Offices OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity 
.00 
Mean 210.50 190.04 52690.1885 33.59 1.1542 .01 .11 5.8008 
N 2534 1338 3310 2022 3322 2747 2747 3378 
Std. Deviation 322.314 177.883 334350.63809 65.784 .65593 .111 2.017 100.69973 
1.00 
Mean 250.23 176.27 62746.3465 31.30 1.1753 .01 .10 6.1807 
N 1737 1112 2202 1517 2128 1817 1815 2184 
Std. Deviation 710.193 166.840 289976.91014 71.130 .74080 .130 1.509 80.74443 
Total 
Mean 226.65 183.79 56707.5434 32.61 1.1624 .01 .11 5.9500 
N 4271 2450 5512 3539 5450 4564 4562 5562 
Std. Deviation 516.783 173.059 317379.77899 68.127 .69032 .119 1.832 93.36644 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Cost_Borrower 
Between Groups 1626758.168 1 1626758.168 6.099 .014 
Within Groups 1138738818.978 4269 266746.034 
  
Total 1140365577.146 4270 
   
Cost_Loan 
Between Groups 115109.081 1 115109.081 3.848 .050 
Within Groups 73231087.001 2448 29914.660 
  
Total 73346196.082 2449 
   
Num_Act_Borrowers 
Between Groups 133721202884.655 1 133721202884.655 1.328 .249 
Within Groups 
554988890577859.
700 
5510 100723936584.004 
  
Total 
555122611780744.
300 
5511 
   
Offices 
Between Groups 4515.494 1 4515.494 .973 .324 
Within Groups 16416170.989 3537 4641.270 
  
Total 16420686.483 3538 
   
OSS 
Between Groups .577 1 .577 1.211 .271 
Within Groups 2596.110 5448 .477 
  
Total 2596.687 5449 
   
ROA 
Between Groups .000 1 .000 .015 .901 
Within Groups 64.526 4562 .014 
  
Total 64.527 4563 
   
ROE 
Between Groups .087 1 .087 .026 .872 
Within Groups 15306.241 4560 3.357 
  
Total 15306.328 4561 
   
Debt_Equity 
Between Groups 191.387 1 191.387 .022 .882 
Within Groups 48476673.943 5560 8718.826 
  
Total 48476865.330 5561 
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 Table 4: Cost_Borrower Cost_Loan Num_Act_Borrowers Offices OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity  * NGO 
NGO Cost_Borrower Cost_Loan Num_Act_Borrow
ers 
Offices OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity 
.00 
Mean 245.51 194.50 61024.7024 33.85 1.1728 .01 .13 5.1637 
N 3576 2097 4637 3022 4590 3845 3846 4687 
Std. Deviation 549.533 177.947 339642.20184 71.994 .63687 .107 1.851 79.68358 
1.00 
Mean 129.61 120.20 33829.0674 25.36 1.1069 -.02 .01 10.1618 
N 695 353 875 517 860 719 716 875 
Std. Deviation 276.212 122.801 150452.97541 37.629 .92325 .168 1.724 146.29214 
Total 
Mean 226.65 183.79 56707.5434 32.61 1.1624 .01 .11 5.9500 
N 4271 2450 5512 3539 5450 4564 4562 5562 
Std. Deviation 516.783 173.059 317379.77899 68.127 .69032 .119 1.832 93.36644 
 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Cost_Borrower 
Between Groups 7816463.107 1 7816463.107 29.463 .000 
Within Groups 1132549114.038 4269 265296.115 
  
Total 1140365577.146 4270 
   
Cost_Loan 
Between Groups 1667809.122 1 1667809.122 56.960 .000 
Within Groups 71678386.960 2448 29280.387 
  
Total 73346196.082 2449 
   
Num_Act_Borrowers 
Between Groups 544420344991.312 1 544420344991.312 5.409 .020 
Within Groups 
554578191435753.2
00 
5510 100649399534.619 
  
Total 
555122611780744.5
00 
5511 
   
Offices 
Between Groups 31762.705 1 31762.705 6.855 .009 
Within Groups 16388923.778 3537 4633.566 
  
Total 16420686.483 3538 
   
OSS 
Between Groups 3.149 1 3.149 6.616 .010 
Within Groups 2593.538 5448 .476 
  
Total 2596.687 5449 
   
ROA 
Between Groups .708 1 .708 50.581 .000 
Within Groups 63.819 4562 .014 
  
Total 64.527 4563 
   
ROE 
Between Groups 8.990 1 8.990 2.680 .102 
Within Groups 15297.339 4560 3.355 
  
Total 15306.328 4561 
   
Debt_Equity 
Between Groups 18419.743 1 18419.743 2.113 .146 
Within Groups 48458445.587 5560 8715.548 
  
Total 48476865.330 5561 
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             Table 5: Cost_Borrower Cost_Loan Num_Act_Borrowers Offices OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity  * Rural_Bank 
Rural_Bank Cost_Borrower Cost_Loan Num_Act_Borrowe
rs 
Offices OSS ROA ROE Debt_Equity 
.00 
Mean 239.06 193.42 61921.5306 35.29 1.1510 .00 .10 5.9423 
N 3840 2165 4906 3104 4821 4065 4063 4923 
Std. Deviation 541.743 178.087 335907.29014 71.538 .72535 .125 1.934 99.21398 
1.00 
Mean 116.08 110.68 14496.6172 13.48 1.2498 .03 .16 6.0088 
N 431 285 606 435 629 499 499 639 
Std. Deviation 134.800 102.633 27578.74826 28.762 .29679 .037 .473 6.57539 
Total 
Mean 226.65 183.79 56707.5434 32.61 1.1624 .01 .11 5.9500 
N 4271 2450 5512 3539 5450 4564 4562 5562 
Std. Deviation 516.783 173.059 317379.77899 68.127 .69032 .119 1.832 93.36644 
 
                                                                                                                               ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Cost_Borrower 
Between Groups 5861196.716 1 5861196.716 22.055 .000 
Within Groups 1134504380.430 4269 265754.130 
  
Total 1140365577.146 4270 
   
Cost_Loan 
Between Groups 1723824.135 1 1723824.135 58.919 .000 
Within Groups 71622371.947 2448 29257.505 
  
Total 73346196.082 2449 
   
Num_Act_Borrowers 
Between Groups 1213120809142.542 1 1213120809142.542 12.067 .001 
Within Groups 
553909490971601.25
0 
5510 100528038288.857 
  
Total 
555122611780743.80
0 
5511 
   
Offices 
Between Groups 181428.659 1 181428.659 39.516 .000 
Within Groups 16239257.823 3537 4591.252 
  
Total 16420686.483 3538 
   
OSS 
Between Groups 5.435 1 5.435 11.427 .001 
Within Groups 2591.252 5448 .476 
  
Total 2596.687 5449 
   
ROA 
Between Groups .383 1 .383 27.249 .000 
Within Groups 64.144 4562 .014 
  
Total 64.527 4563 
   
ROE 
Between Groups 1.602 1 1.602 .477 .490 
Within Groups 15304.726 4560 3.356 
  
Total 15306.328 4561 
   
Debt_Equity 
Between Groups 2.502 1 2.502 .000 .986 
Within Groups 48476862.828 5560 8718.860 
  
Total 48476865.330 5561 
   
 
